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I. Introduction
When the parental status of one or more people involved in
a civil action is contested in a court in the United States, the need
for a legal parentage determination arises. Fifty years ago such
contests were rare. Today they are common.
In these contests, legal parentage can differ from personally
and/or publicly perceived parentage. Legal parentage can also
differ by context, as between child custody and child support
settings.
Legal parentage most often varies by context in a single
American state where the purposes behind varying parentage
laws differ, as where biology is key in one setting and parentallike acts are key in another setting. A need for a parentage determination can arise, inter alia, in contests over child custody/
visitation/parental responsibility allocation (herein "childcare");
child support; heirship in probate; domestic violence; and standing to pursue tort remedies.
Parental status laws are challenging today because increasingly they no longer operate chiefly at birth or during a formal
adoption. Rather, more frequently parental status under law
Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B .A.,
Colby College; J.D., The University of Chicago.
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arises due to actions occurring preconception; postconception
but prebirth; or long after birth but with no formal adoption. 2
Parentage contests are even more challenging when relevant
conduct occurs in several states. Family relationships can first be
established in one state, be continued in a second state, and only
become legally disputed in a third state. For example, an unwed
couple can conceive a child via sex in one state, the child can be
born in a second state, and the birth mother and child can thereafter move to a third state where a parent status contest first
arises. Or, a romantic female couple can first reside in one state,
prompt per agreement a pregnancy for one spouse/partner or a
surrogate in a second state, and then split up, whereupon one of
the women and the child move to a third state where parentage is
first contested.
The fallowing sections reflect on some of the challenges facing judges, lawyers, families, the public at large, and the state(s)
interested in legal parentage contests. These challenges include
issues reviewed in Section II on finding the source(s) of parentage law, which sometimes necessitate analyzing shared governmental powers; issues reviewed in Section III involving differing
intrastate parentage laws by context; issues reviewed in Section
IV involving interstate parentage law variations in a single context; and, issues reviewed in Section Von choosing between conflicting state laws in multistate conduct cases.

II. Finding Parentage Laws
While the interests of a parent in the "care, custody and control" of a child is said by the U.S. Supreme Court to encompass a
fundamental constitutional right,3 the role of the federal constitution in defining parental status in childcare settings is surprisFurther complicating parental status laws are other laws that speak to
parental-like acts or interests for those who remain nonparents. Thus in Illinois, a court can order an "allocation of parental responsibilities" for a child on
behalf of a nonparent, like a grandparent or a stepparent. 750 ILL CoMP. STAT.
§§ 5/601.2(b )( 4), (5) (2021).
3
Such rights were generally recognized in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U .S.
57, 65 (2000) ("perhaps the oldest of tbe liberty interests recognized") (plurality
opinion).
2
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ingly limited. 4 Further, the role of state constitutions in
determining such status varies greatly among the states. So,
much is left to state statutes and state common law precedents.
This makes locating parental status laws quite challenging.
As to the federal constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court and
Congress have significantly deferred to American state
lawmakers on the issue of who possesses parental childcare rights
under federal substantive due process. This deference will likely
continue. 5 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that constitutional parental childcare rights involving the "care, custody, and
control" of children need not always be recognized in state laws
for unwed biological fathers of children born of consensual sex to
either a married or to an unmarried woman. 6 By contrast, the
Supreme Court has nationalized the norms on the holders of
other federal constitutional privacy rights like contraception,
abortion, sexual conduct, and marriage. 7
Some state high courts have deferred, significantly if not
wholly, to their general assemblies on the parents who possess
federal, constitutionally-protected, childcare rights; others have
not, employing both state constitutional precedents and state

See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IowA L.
REv. 1483, 1491-1502 (2018).
s See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents,
90 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 965 (2016), analyzing the cases foUowing United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) ("solicitude for state interests, particularly in
the field of family and family-property arrangements"). A caU for more U.S.
Supreme Court guidance on how states can define federal constitutional due
process parenthood appears in Higdon, supra note 4, at 1541 ("it is time for the
Court to return to the subject of constitutional parenthood and provide a more
contemporary definition - one that, at a minimum, both recognizes and protects the rights of intentional parents").
6 On births to those married to others, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U .S. 110 (1989) (states can create, if they wish, irrebuttable presumptions of
spousal parentage). On births to those unwed, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983) (states can deny, if they wish, opportunities for biological fathers to
participate in adoption proceedings involving children born to unwed mothers
which were initiated by the mothers where the fathers failed to establish a parent-child relationship with the child).
7 Parness, Federal Childcare Parents, supra note 5, at 976.
4
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common ]aw precedents. 8 At times, common law precedents establishing new parentage fonns are superseded by legislation. 9
Notwithstanding state law dominance, the U.S. Supreme
Court has invalidated some state laws regarding parental rights
to childcare on federal procedural due process and/or federal
equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court gives no state deference on these matters.
State laws are vulnerable both in childcare parent establishment and disestablishment settings. Federal procedural due process, for example, was key in a parentage disestablishment case
involving the termination of earlier-recognized parental childcare
rights. The Court ruled that clear and convincing evidence was
necessary for a termination. 10 Federal substantive due process
was also key in a disestablishment case involving an unwed father
of a child whose birth mother had died. 11
Federal equal protection, similarly, was central to a case on
childcare parentage establishment involving the interests of a genetic father in rearing his child placed for adoption by the birth

8 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional
Childcare Parents: More Principled Allocations of Powers and More Rational
Distinctions, 50 CREIGHTON L. REv. 479, 489-504 (2017) (reviewing differing
state approaches to parentage lawmaking by constitutional interpretation, statutes, and common law precedents).
9 Consider the de facto parentage form, initially introduced in Maine via
precedent. See, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169 (Me. 2014). The form was
later este,lblished by legislation whose norms are similar to those in the 2017
Uniform Parentage Act ("2017 UPA"). See 19 ME. STAT. 1891 (effective July
1, 2016); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr Comment to§ 609 (2017) (the 2017 UPA draft
utilized the Maine statute, as well as the Wisconsin precedent of In re Custody
of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995)). Some de facto parent precedents
have not been later codified, as with Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 446-447
(Md. 2016) (utilizing H.S.H.-K.). The 2017 UPA has also been significantly
adopted in Rhode Island and Washington in the absence of earlier precedents.
See R. I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8.1-101 to 15-8.1-10.104 (2021); WASH. STAT.
§§ 26.26A.005 to 26.26A.903 (2021).
10 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that a state must
prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence).
11 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 659-660 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (noting that while the father had urged equal protection analysis, the majority utilized due process reasoning, finding the father had "sired and raised"
the child, 405 U.S. at 651).
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mother. 12 The Court recognized there could be a "difference between maternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child's
development. " 13
A few American state courts have employed their own state
constitutions to define childcare parentage beyond the limited
guidelines of the U.S. Supreme Court. In Iowa, the high court
recognized, under its state constitution's liberty protections,
broader parentage opportunities for unwed parents whose sexual
acts prompted pregnancies and births to women married to
others. 14 Elsewhere, there are available explicit state constitutional privacy rights unlike any - explicit or implied - found in the
federal constitution. 15
Without state constitutional law precedents, state legislatures have significantly defined parentage for childcare, as well as
nonchildcare, purposes. Yet there are some common law (nonconstitutional) precedents, which sometimes lead to, or are preempted by, new legislation. 16
Nevertheless, deferring state high courts occasionally review
lower precedents and legislation on childcare parentage under
12 The birth mother supported the adoption petition by her husband, the
child's stepfather. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 383 (1979).
13 Caban, 441 U.S . at 389. The court observed there may be a rational
difference when the children are newborn. Id. at 389. Rational differences also
permeate prebirth parental opportunity interests. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at
261 ( explaining how only an unwed biological father of a child born of consensual sex must demonstrate "a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood" to acquire "substantial protection under the due process clause").
14
Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 1999) (stating that
under the Iowa constitution there is "a strong history of providing protection"
to parentage based on biological ties).
15 See, e.g., FLA. CoNST. Art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person bas the right
to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except
as otherwise provided herein."). This provision is broader, more fundamental,
and more highly guarded than its federal counterparts. Winfield v. Div. of PariMutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (noting the provision's drafters rejected using the words "unreasonable" or "unwarranted" before the
phrase "governmental intrusion").
16 See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 166-167 (Wash. 2005)
("first impression" common Jaw case); Matter of J.D.W., 471 P.3d 228, 231
(Wash. Ct. App. 2020) ("first impression" case under 2018 Washington Uniform Parentage Act). On the differing state court approaches to common lawmaking on issues of childcare parentage, see, e.g.,. Parness, State Lawmaking,
supra note 8, at 495-504.
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both procedural due process and equal protection. 17 Less constitutional review is undertaken in parentage cases outside of childcare, such as in torts and probate, since fundamental rights are
not usually implicated. There is no constitutional right to inherit
from a biological parent's estate or to be compensated when a
biological parent is wrongly injured. 18
Finally, even when the parentage lawmaker is identified, locating the parentage law can still be challenging. For example,
different terms/phrases are employed by legislators in different
states to cover the same parentage form. Thus, there are voluntary parentage acknowledgments (V APs) and recognitions of
parentage (ROPs) 19 in childcare settings: There are de facto
parents, psychological parents, equitable parents, and in loco
parentis parents in cmldcare settings. 20 When the lawmakers are
identified, new challenges await as there are significant intrastate
differences in parental status laws.

DI. Intrastate Parentage Law Variations Between
Contexts
Legal parentage is key in many civil actions beyond childcare, including child support, tort, and probate disputes. Pur17 See, e.g., Doherty v. Leon, 472 P.3d 531, (j[ 11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020)
(ruling that the wife of a birth mother is a presumptive parent of a child as
would be a husband).
18 While there is no constitutional right for a child to recover in probate
or in tort arising from the death of a biological parent who had successfully
earlier placed the child for adoption, state laws can recognize such recoveries.
See, e.g., TEx. EsT. CooE §§ 201.054(b ), 22.004(a)(2) (20210; Rismiller v. Gemini Ins. Co., 330 So.3d 145 (La. 2021) (holding that wrongful death and survival
actions were allowed for a minor, but not an adult, child when the biological
father and half siblings died in an accident). See also TEx. FAM. CooE
§ 162.507(c) (2021) (stating that an adopted child, but not an adopted adult, can
inherit from the estate of a deceased natural parent).
19 See, e.g., 750 ILL CoMP. STAT.§ 46/301 (VAPs) (2022); MINN . STAT.
§ 257.75 (ROPs) (2021).
20
See, e.g., DEL CooE tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4) (2021) (de facto parent);
Laker v. Putman, 894 N.W.2d 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (equitable parent); and
Windham v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 710 (Neb. 2016) (in loco parentis parent,
though such a parent does not possess all the rights held by a natural or adoptive parent); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005) (psychological
parent).
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poses behind parentage designations often vary by context.
There should be no single size for all. Yet proper differentiations
are difficult because unlike childcare parentage, there are generally no comparable comprehensive proposals on parental status
in many nonchildcare parent contexts, leaving state lawmakers
with difficult drafting tasks. Civil litigation parties, lawyers, and
judges, as well as legislators, families, and the public at large,
need to understand the challenges posed by contextual parentage
in intrastate settings.
In civil actions, legal parent status should always be first approached contextually. The need is exemplified in a state where
laws make a biological father a child support parent, but not a
childcare parent. 21 Unfortunately, at times lawmakers fail to
consider their policy goals in context, leading them to some unreasonable differentia tions be tween parentage norms arising in
quite comparable context . This has happened, for example, in
personal injury and probate settings. In New York, a parent who
abandons a child can recover under the worker's compensation
statute upon a child 's dea th, but cannot recover under the wrongful death or probate statute. 22 Perhaps for simplicity, if not due
to comparable underlying polici es, at times lawmakers in a single
state incorporate a parentage norm from one con text into another context.23
21
A biol gica l father exe rcis ing or having no childcare ri ghts is none theless a parent for child support purposes. See, e.g., N .E. v. H edges, 391 F .3d 832,
836 (6th Cir. 2004); D pt. of H ealth & Fam. Serv ·. v. Are vaJo, 68 N.E.3d 652
(Ill. A p p. Ct. 2016) (reviewing suppor t cases); In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745
(Iowa 2011) ( rulin g tha t chil d support duties only e nd upon termin ation of parental rights) . In Illinois there is paren tage via equita ble adoptj on for probate,
but not fo r parental r ponsi bi]jty a llocation. See D eHart v. DeHart, 986
N. ,.2d 85 , 103-05 (Ill. 2013} (h ld ing that an equitably adopted child can inherit from tl1 e esta te of a deceased biological father); In re Scarlett Z .-D., 28
N.E.3d 776, 792 (Ill. 2015) ( deciding that the equitable adoption doctrine is inapplicable in the childcare context).
22
See, e.g. , Caldwell v. Alliance Consulting Group, Inc., 775 N.Y.S. 2d 92
(N.Y . App. Div. 2004) (recogn izing an a and o ni.og pa rent a n ever thele s elig ible to shar e in d ea th benefits invo lving hi child und er the W orkers' Compensatio n La w tho ugh he would be ineligi ble to be a surviving pare nt in a proba te or
wrongful death case). Similar distinctions are drawn in Smith v. Smith, 130 So.
3d 508, 'll'ir 10-12 (Miss. 2014).
23
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CoDE § 1-201(5) (amended 2019) ("child
means an individual of any age whose parentage is established under [cite to
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In a single context, one finds significant interstate differences. These variations prompt additional challenges for those
applying parental status laws.

IV. Interstate Parentage Law Variations in a
Single Context
Interstate movements make legal parentage determinations
more challenging because state laws often vary interstate within a
single context, as with laws on surrogacy agreements, 24 de facto
parents,25 and hold out/residency parents. 26 Further, childcare
parentage disestablishment norms, that is, the norms on waiving
parental custody/visitation rights, differ widely interstate. For
example, state laws differ in voluntary acknowledgment settings
on when earlier parentage acknowledgments can be cballenged27
and in spousal2 8 parent settings on when the presumptive parentage in the spouses of those giving birth can be rebutted. Thus,
choice of law issues often must be resolved before parentage
norms are applied in cases involving relevant multistate conduct.
Since 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, now titled the Uniform Law Commission,
has proposed parentage acts that seek to unify state laws on
childcare parentage. The 2017 proposed version of the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) contains some very different approaches to
childcare parentage than were suggested in the 1973 UPA and
the 2000 UP A. The 2017 UPA, for example, expressly recognizes, for the first time, a voluntary parentage acknowledgment
option for a female partner of a birth mother. 29 As well, the 2017
Uniform Parentage Act (2017)]"); ALASKA STAT.§ 13.12.114 (illegitimate child
can establish fatherhood of a decedent in a probate case under the Uniform
Parentage Act).
24 Compare, for example, the laws in two states otherwise generally following the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act. VT. STAT. tit. 15C, § 801 (2021) (gestational carrier agreements); WASH . .REv. ConE § 26.26.A.715 (gestational or
genetic surrogacy agreements).
25 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Illinois Childcare Parentage Law
(R)Evolution, 51 LoYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 911, 937-38 (2020).
26
See, e.g., id. at 929-32.
27
See, e.g., id., at 925-28.
28
See, e.g., id., at 921-23.
29 2017 UPA § 301 ( an intended nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction parent or a spouse can sign a V AP together with the person who gave birth) .
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UPA first recognizes a "de facto" parent doctrine, which is quite
different from the "hold out" parent doctrine under the 2000 and
2017 UP As. 30 De facto parenthood does not require residency
with the child from the time of birth or for a minimum number of
years as does "hold out" parenthood. The 2017 UPA also has
new approaches to assisted reproduction contracts involving no
surrogate, a genetic surrogate, or a gestational surrogate. 31 A
few states have already substantially adopted the 2017 UP A. 32
Other state UP As continue with different parentage provisions
from earlier UPAs, as with the 1973 UP A provisions on "hold
out" parentage.33
Interstate variations in childcare parentage exist even when
comparable terms are used because there are varied definitions
of the same terms in UP As. Thus, the 1973 UP A recognizes a
presumption of paternity in a man who "receives the child into
his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child"
while "the child is under the age of majority." 34 In the 2000
UP A, that provision was replaced by a recognition of a "presumption of paternity" in a man who "for the first two years of
the child's life ... resided in the same household with the child
and openly held out the child as his own. " 35 This presumption,
however, can "apply to determinations of maternity." 36 The 2017
UPA recognizes "an individual is presumed to be a parent of a
child if ... the individual resided in the same household with the
child for the first two years of the life of the child .... and openly
30 Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 25, at 932-37 (review-

ing the American Law Institute's approaches to de facto parentage).
31 2017 UPA §§ 701-708 (no surrogate), 808-812 (gestational surrogate),
813-818 (genetic surrogate).
32 RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8.1-101-15-8.l-10.104 (2021) presumed hold out/
residency parent; VT. STAT. tit 15C, §§ 101-809; WASH. REv. CoDE
§§ 26.26A.005-26.26A.903 (2021).
33 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CoDE § 7611(d) (2021) (presumed natural hold
out/residency parent, based on 1973 UPA § 4(a)(4)).
34 1973 UPA § 4(a)(4). This presumption substantially operates in some
states. See, e.g., CAL. FAM . CODE§ 7611(d) (2021); HAwA11 REv. STAT. § 584-4
(2021); NEVADA REV. STAT. § 126.05(1)(d) (2021).
35 2000 UPA § 204(a)(5). This presumption substantially operates in
some states. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. § 7700-204(a)(5) (2021); TEx. FAM. CoDE
§ 160.204(a)(5) (2021).
36 2000 UPA § 106.
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held out the child as the individual's child. " 37 So, the holdout/
residency parentage norms differ interstate due to the different
UPA approaches, as well as to some unique individual state
adaptations. 38
There are interstate parentage law variations in contexts beyond childcare, as with child support, tort, probate, and criminal
laws. As to child support, states differ on what, if any, duties are
assigned stepparents. 39 As to heirship of children in intestate
probate proceedings, one state defines parentage according to
the state Parentage Act while another has a common law precedent on equitable adoption. 40 Here, as in intrastate settings,
challenges await lawyers, judges, parties, the state, families, and
the public.
In probate, interstate variations arise where different versions of the same model act have been enacted. The NCCUSL
and its successor have proposed varying Uniform Probate Code
("UPC") provisions. Since 2019, a parent generally is defined as
"an individual who has established a parent-child relationship
under" the 2017 UPA. 41 Prior to 2019, a parent was "any person
entitled to take, or who would be entitled to take if the child died
without a will, as a parent ... by intestate succession from the
child whose relationship is in question and excludes any person
who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent. " 42 Both

37 2017 UPA§ 204(a)(2) . This presumption operates in some states. See,
e.g., RI. GEN. LAws § 15-8.l-401(a)(4) (2019), VT. STAT. tit. 15C, § 401(a)(4)
(2018).
38 Compare ALA. CooE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2021) (also need to establish
"significant parental relationship"), with N.J. STAT. §§ 9:17-43(a)(4), (5) (2021)
(hold out parentage if there is either receipt of a child under the age of majority
into the "borne" or provision of "support" for such a child).
39
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew Timko, De Facto Parent &
Nonparent Child Support Orders, 67 AMER. U. L. REv. 769, 823-26 (2018).
40
Compare UTAH CoDE § 75-2-114 (2021) (parent-child relationship can
be established in intestate succession cases under the Uniform Parentage Act)
with DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 100-04 (Ill. 2013) (common law equitable adoption doctrine operates in intestate succession cases).
4 1 2019 UPC § 1-201(32). The 2019 UPC also has special provisions,
again referencing the 2017 UPA, on parentage in assisted birth settings. See,
e.g., 2019 UPC§§ 2-120 (no surrogate), 2-121 (gestational or genetic surrogate).
42
1969 UPC § 1-201(32).
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the earlier and current UPC recognize states can add to parentage through "the doctrine of equitable adoption." 43

V. Choosing Parentage Laws
The NCCUSL and its successor, in both the 2017 UP A and
the 2000 UPA, tried to limit the uncertainties in interstate settings by proposing a simple choice of law norm applicable to
childcare parentage contexts. 44 That norm declares a court must
always choose its own state's laws in adjudicating disputes about
parenthood in childcare and child support cases regardless of a
child's place of birth or residence. 45 The NCCUSL approach to
choosing parentage laws, however, recognizes choice of law
norms can be special, that is, applicable only in limited contexts.46 So while parentage adjudications under the 2017 UPA
generally are governed by forum law, 47 a special provision requires a state court to give full faith and credit to parentage establishments through voluntary acknowledgment processes that
were undertaken in another state. 4s
Unfortunately, a court that chooses its own parentage laws,
whether in childcare, probate, or elsewhere, may run afoul of
U.S. Supreme Court precedents on Full Faith and Credit obligations and/or a state's own policies on interstate comity. Problems
1969 UPC § 2-122; 2019 UPC § 2-122.
44 T his norm appea rs in the 2000 Uniform Par entage Act (UPA), at
§ 103(b) and in the 2017 UPA, at§ 105. The n orm oft en is fo!Jowed, as in Illinois. 750 I LL. C oMP. STAT. § 46/104(b) (decl aring within th e IUinoi Parentage
Act of 2015, that adjudication of ' the parent-child rela tio nship" do ' not depend on .. . the place of birth of the child ... or ... the past or present
residence of the child" and thus that the Act will apply to a "determination of
parentage in this State").
45
A more detailed criticism of this norm appears in Jeffrey A. Parness,
Faithful Parents: Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER L. REv. 325
(2019).
46 Thus the 2000 UP A says a court shall apply its own law "to adjudicate
the parent-child relationship," but then says "full faith and credit" must be
given to a voluntary parentage acknowledgment "effective" in another state.
2000 UPA §§ 103(b), 311 . T he deferral arises from a fede ral welfare subsidy
law th at requires full fa ith and credit be given to a volun tary parentage ackn owledgment "signed io any other State according to its procedures." 28
U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(c)(iv). The 2017 UPA is similar. 2017 UPA §§ 105, 311.
47
2017 UPA § 105.
48
2017UPA§311.
43
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can arise in parentage settings where a case in one state implicates significant parental and/or parental-like conduct in another
state. Consider cases involving challenges to voluntary parentage
acknowledgments (V APs) undertaken in other states. 49 A court
applying its own V AP laws may rule against the legitimate expectations of some signing people as to later YAP overrides (via
"challenges") when the people move between states as well as of
the lawmakers who regulate family relationships within the signing state. Consider also the situation of an unvalidated genetic
surrogacy contract undertaken and fully satisfied in one state
which is later challenged in another state where such a contract is
prohibited. 5° Finally, consider the aforedescribed parentage
49
Consider, for example, the typical state statutory requirement that
YAP challenges after 60 day be founded on fraud, dures , or material mistake
of fact. This mandate is implemented quite differently between states on,
among other issues, what constitutes fraud, who can initiate a challenge and
bow long one with standing has to challenge. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness &
David Saxe, Reforming the Processes for Challenging Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity, 92 CHICAGO-KENT L. REv. 177, 183-203 (2017). These mandates are driven by federally- ubsidized welfare benefits laws. 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(5)(D)(iii), as recognized in 2000 UPA § 308 and 2017 UPA §§ 309, 610
(which proposes a two year limitations p riod and a ' ignatory challenger, as
well as a challenger who, according to 2017 UPA § 602, includes "ao individual
whose parentage is to be adjudicated," a "child-support agency," or an "adoption agency ").
Under federal statute, a court shall give full faith and credit to a VAP effective in another state if th e V AP complies with the law of the other state. 42
U .. C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv) as recognized in 2000 UPA § 311 and 2017 UPA
§ 311. Such credjt was given to an unchallenged YAP in Adoption of Jaelyn B.,
883 N.W.2d 22 (Neb. 2016). Ye t it i unclear whether one state needs to credit
another state's V AP chaUenge statute since a YAP may no longer be effective in
the other tate if the other state's fraud, time Limits, or standing requisites are
followed. Stated differently, it is unclear whether the federal statute demands a
second state respect the laws in a V AP signing state on both initial and continuing effectiveness.
so Under the 2017 UPA, a genetic surrogacy contract can be validated by
a court before artificial insemination or during pregnancy. 2017 UPA §§ 813
(preconception validation where contract requirements of UPA are met and
partie agreed voluntarily, with understandings of the contract lerms); 816(b)
(postconception validation needs for the parties to then agr e) . In each instance there is a court order e tablishing (expecting) parentage. When there is
no validatfon there is no earlier court order to which the new residential state
can look to in order to give credit. While the 2017 UP A addresses the parentage processes ari ing from unvalidated genetic surrogacy contracts, at§§ 816(c)
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norms on residency/hold out and de facto parentage, which each
look to conduct occurring long before the initiation of an action
to adjudicate a parent-child relationship.
The problems arising from always employing one's own parentage laws are well illustrated by the case of Johnson v. Johnson.51 There, Antonyio and Madonna, living in New Jersey in
1988, took custody in Pennsylvania of Jessica, then three months
old and the natural grandchild of Madonna. 52 Jessica's birth
mother - who was married to Madonna's son who was then in
jail - placed Jessica with the Johnsons; Jessica was scheduled to
remain with the Johnsons for a month. 53 However, ten years
later she was still with the Johnsons. 54 During the decade the
Johnsons had resided both in New Jersey and Florida. 55 In 1998,
Antonyio moved to North Dakota where he filed for divorce.
Madonna was then living with Jessica in Kentucky. 56 In response
to the divorce suit, Madonna sought child support from
Antonyio. 57 Applying its own common law principles on equitable adoption, the North Dakota high court found Antonyio was
and (d) (differentiating a genetic surrogate's withdrawal of consent before and
after 72 hours from birth), these process norms may not be recognized in a
state, like Michigan, per MICH. CoMP. LAws § 722.855 (barring genetic surrogacy contracts) or Indiana, per IND. CooE § 31-20-1-1 (restrictions on surrogate
agreements). On the differences in American state surrogacy laws, see
Courtney G. Joslin, Surrogacy and the Politics of Pregnancy, 14 HARV. L. &
PoL'Y REv. 365 (2020). On choice of law issues when there are no earlier court
orders, see, e.g., Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth
Parentage Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM L. Q. 633 (2005). On how
contractual choice of law clauses in surrogacy contracts may be viewed, see,
e.g., Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004) (enforcing the clause, but
noting there was a "close question" on "fundamental policy" of one interested
state).
While the judges in states following the 2000 UPA or 2017 UP A are told to
utilize their own state's childcare parentage laws, those same judges often approach conflicting state contract laws outside of genetic surrogacy pacts by employing an interest analysis. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW TmRD:
CoNFLJCT oF LAws, Preliminary Draft No. 6 at 811 (Sept. 29, 2020).
51 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000).
52 Id. at 100.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 101.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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liable as a parent for support, with liability calculated under
North Dakota laws . 58
The problems in the Johnson ruling jump out. No significant
acts prompting Antonio's equitable adoption occurred in North
Dakota. The needs of Jessica arose in Kentucky, while
Antonyio's assets were in North Dakota. The interests of Jessica's biological parents were never considered, and likely could
not have been, given personal jurisdiction constraints. And,
there was no consideration of the governmental interests of New
Jersey and Florida in Antonyio's earlier childcare (if not the interests of Pennsylvania in Antonyio's earlier agreement to care
for Jessica).
In a case like Johnson, forum laws should only be used after
inquiry into forum choice of law rules. These rules might prompt
(if not require per Full Faith and Credit) the employment of outof-state parentage laws. It seems far more reasonable to assess
Antonyio's support parentage under North Dakota law in a
North Dakota probate context prompted by Antonyio's death in
North Dakota than to assess Antonyio's parentage under North
Dakota law in a child support context ( and certainly in a child
custody/visitation context). Choice of law analysis, rather than
simply using forum law, would be deferential to both individual
expectations and legitimate governmental interests.
Another troubling choice of law case, involving UPA-like de
facto parentage for child custody purposes, is SD. v. K.H., 59 a
2018 Ohio court ruling. Here, there was a 2007 Ohio divorce
decree which found a husband and wife to be the biological and
legal parents of a child. 60 The decree established "full and legal
custody" in ·the mother, with visitation for the father. 61 Shortly
after the divorce, the wife began a relationship with a woman;
she and the child moved with the woman to California in 2008;
the women ended their relationship in 2010, but continued to
"share parenting responsibilities. " 62 In July 2013, the birth
mother ended child contact with the woman.6 3 Thereafter, a Calss Id. at 109-10.
98 N.E.3d 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) .
60 S.D., 98 N.E.3d at 376.
59

61

62

63

ld.
Id.
Id.
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ifornia court in 2014 found, in a stipulated order, that the other
woman ("Mother 2") was also a childcare parent for the child.
But in early 2016, the father sought to set aside in California the
2014 parentage order favoring "Mother 2. " 64 This occurred after
the natural mother sought a California court order allowing her
to relocate with the child to Ohio. The natural mother and child
moved to Ohio without any court ruling on relocation. 65 The
California court denied the relocation request in July 2016, finding Ohio courts retained "continuing and exclusive jurisdiction"
over all custody matters. 66 This was followed by Mother 2's petition in September 2016 asking the Ohio divorce court to enforce
the California parentage order - a request opposed by both natural parents. 67 The Ohio court denied, in late 2016, Mother 2's
petition to enforce, though it recognized that she could pursue a
child "companionship time" order under Ohio law as an intervenor in the 2007 divorce case. 68 The Ohio court ruled Mother 2
could not pursue a child "parenting time" order because the California court's parentage order was issued without subject matter
jurisdiction. 69 These rulings were affirmed, with "the companionship matter" left for trial. 70
The Ohio court clearly chose not to defer to the California
law recognizing Mother 2 could be a third legal parent. 71 The
Ohio court did so because "Ohio does not recognize more than
two legal parents," 72 rejecting Mother 2's argument that Ohio
courts should apply California's three-parent law to her parentage request because all of Mother 2's parental-like actions occurred in California, as did the concession of her parentage by
the birth mother, who had "full and legal custody." 73 This failure
to defer meant that Mother 2's nonparental companionship claim
would be adjudicated in Ohio under Ohio law. The Ohio court
64
65

66
67

68
69
70

71

Id.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id.

CAL FAM. CooE § 7612(c) (to avoid detriment to the child), cited at
S.D., 98 N.E.3d at 379.
72 S.D., 98 N.E.3d at 379.
73 Jd. at 376-78.
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failed to consider California's governmental interests in the
childcare of a child who bad been living in California, where two
women shared "joint physical custody" for at least two years and
where the child was moved to Ohio before a ruling on a requested relocation.74 The Ohio court also did not consjder
whether a California court provided "a more convenient forum"
to resolve the nonparent companionship claim of a woman in
Califomia. 75
The choice of law approach in parentage cases involving relevant conduct in two or more states surely is simple to apply - a
court always uses its own laws. Yet this approach is troubling (if
not unconstitutional) when all of the conduct relevant to the parentage law issue occurred outside the forum. As in cases involving nonparentage issues, a court should sometimes choose to
apply nonforum law on parental status issues. Such choices
would respect the wishes of outside lawmakers and meet the expectations of the parties.

VI. Conclusion
Parental status laws in the United States have become increasingly challenging. Difficulties arise when adults and/or children move interstate. Difficulties also arise when there are no
interstate moves because intrastate paren.t age norms and terminology often vary by context, as in child custody and child support settings. This can be confusing to litigating parties, if not
lawyers and judges. There is, and should be, no one-size-fits-all
approach to legal parenthood.
Difficulties will continue as state laws more frequently recognize parental status in the absence of blood ties, marriage and
formal adoption, often at times other than at birth. Expecting
legal parentage is now often recognized preconception, as with
artificial insemination and surrogacy contracts, or postconception
but prebirth, as with voluntary parentage acknowledgments and
assisted reproduction contracts. Existing legal parentage is now
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377 n.1 (noting that, according to the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCOEA) adopted in Ohio, a state court
can "decline jurisdiction if another state would offer a more convenient forum"). In the Ohio case, the companionship claim of a California person involved a child and two legal parents who then all lived in Ohio. Id. at 376.
74

75
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often recognized long after birth for acts occurring after birth, as
with "hold out" and de facto parenthood.
Lawyers and judges facing difficulties in identifying parents
also often confront further challenges due to the varying parentage lawmaking sources. Power is differently shared by judges
and legislators in a single state between contexts (like childcare
and probate). An~ power is differently shared between states in
a single context (like childcare and probate).
Judges, lawyers, parties in civil cases, as well as legislators,
families, parents, would-be parents, and the public at large, must
understand the challenges presented by the fast-changing landscape of parent status laws. When asked to identify a parent,
lawyers and judges should respond by asking for what purpose.
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